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Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools-1919
professor needs an operation upon the nose,
if not upon the brain. And no candid professorial mind can listen to Mr. Kocourek's
remarks without realizing that no one is adequately prepared to teach any branch of
the law unless he knows something of the
science of law. Certainly the law professor
should study jurisprudence-should make a
lifelong study of it. Otherwise he finds
himself in the situation of the songster, who
doesn't know where he Is going, but kifows
only that he is on the way. And every law
professor owes a debt to Mr. Kocourek for
the impetus he has given to the study by
furnishing materials otherwise inaccessible
to American lawyers.
Furthernore, we must all subscribe to his
contention that the law schools cannot simply sit tight, satisfied merely to accept and
to apply a "strictly empirical tradition" as
to legal education. We must be at all times
alert and ready to enlarge, or to change the
scope and content of, legal education whenever such enlargement or change is necessary
or desirable. Legal education cannot remain
stagnant. Surely it is wrong to make a mere
Surely it is
fetish of the "case system."
wrong to take the view that, if jurisprudence
cannot be taught by the case system, it
should not be taught at all. We certainly
do not take that view at Harvard.
Furthermore, I heartily agree with Mr.
Kocourek that a college undergraduate is
not equipped to study jurisprudence, and
that, too, for the reason that Mr. Kocourek
gives: "It is precisely because the underlying data are not and cannot be understood"
by him. One cannot generalize until he has
the data upon which to base his generalizations.
But it is for this very reason that it seems
clear to me that a law student also is not
equipped to study jurisprudence until the
end, or near the end, of his course. It is for
tills very reason that at Harvard jurisprudence is given as a fourth-year subject. The
course is open to students in their third year,
however, and a number of them take it with
pleasure and with profit. But Mr. Kocourek
would have the law student take introductory courses in jurisprudence at the very beginning of his law school career. This it
seems to me is unwise. "What understanding," asks Mr. Kocourek, "does he bring to
his discussion of courses in chattels, if he
cannot distinguish a right In renm from a
right in personam?" It seems to me some.what cruel to ram down a student's throat
one professor's conceptions as to the nature
of rights when the student is helpless to defend himself, becauge, like the college undergraduate, he lacks the necessary data on
which to base an independent judgment. Jurisprudence surely cannot be studied in vacuo. Jurisprudence very probably cannot be
taught by the use of cases merely, but surely It should not be taught dogmatically, as
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John Austin taught it, as all the law was
once taught.
But, says Mr. Kocourek, "It Is Idle to suppose that an instructor can Interrupt the
busy hour of class work to make the explanation, or that he Vill succeed if he attempts
it." I must take exception to the idea that
in teaching a branch of the law it is "an
interruption" to consider it scientifically. I
have, for ten years, taught the subject of
Trusts. One df the most difficult theoretical
questions in the law is the question as to
the nature of a trust. Maitland pictures a
German jurist asking the question: "Are we
to place this prc -ous Rechtsinstitut under
the title of Saclenrecht or Obligationenrecht?" Dean Pound and Dean Stone, as
some of you may recall, did not entirely
agree upon the nature of a trust when the
question was mooted here at our last meeting. Think what an advantage it would be
to one of these gentlemen (if they taught law
In the sare school) if he could get the jump
on the other by impressing his views upon
the legal neophyte by giving an introductory
course in jurisprudence.
In some schools it is said that legal educa-'
tion is not as a rule sufficiently practical.
The remedy they suggest is to devote an
enormously large part of the curriculum to
courses on procedure. Mr. Kocourek contends that we have too much of the "tradesman" point of view in legal education, and
suggests as a remedy the devoting of a considerable part of the curriculum to jurisprudence. In some schools they would perhaps combine these two ideas, giving lots of
time to procedure, and lots of time to jurisprudence, and squeezing in from time to time
a bit of substantive law. The question Is, of
course, one of degree, one of the relative value of many good things. But I, for my part,
am not sure that the utilitarian value of law
school Instruction is in proportion to the
nmunt of adjective law taught, nor that the
inculcation of legal idealism Is In proportion
to the number of courses in formal jurisprifdence. I should say this: By all means let
the teachers of law study jurisprudence,
carefully, prayerfully, continuously, consistently. Let the student study it, too, if you
will, but at the end, not at the beginning, of
his course.

A Course in Statutes
By ERNST FREUND
chicago University Law School

Mr. Freund, referring to the fact that since
the meeting of 1916, at which his paper on
Statutes was originally to have been presented, he had published an article upon the
subject, fully developing his ideas, in the
Illinois Law Review (volume XIII, p. 264,
November, 1918), asked permission to speak
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informally. The following is a summary of
the points made in his address.
1. A course in Statutes, to be a distinct
addition to the law curriculum, should be different from the treatment of statutes in
other courses (such as Bankruptcy), and,
above all, should not duplicate the course in
Constitutional Law.
2. A course In Statutes might be conducted with a view to discussing formal requirements (title, form of amendments, etc.),
questions concerning operation (taking effect, rel)eal, etc.), and questions arising out
of the violations of statutes (nullity of acts;
liability). The practical value of such a
course would be considerable; but it would
be like any other course conducted on the
basis of cases, and would present no novel
problems of scope or method.
3. A course in Statutes might also be a
course in Statutory Construction; but such
a course, having no other end than the discovery of rules of construction, would be unsatisfactory, in that all judicial construction
of legislation has an arbitrary eleient in
it; a court being always at liberty to find
a specific Intent at variance with any general rule. The study of judicial construction
would be valuable mainly as a study of
tendencies and possibilities, indicating how
changes of favorable or adverse construction
should affect the drafting of statutes. Familiarity with construction, in other words, is
an indispensable aid in the study of statute
making.
4. The study of Statutes assumes a new
aspect when, instead of asking how a given
situation arising under a statute is to be
dealt with, we inquire how a given situation
is to be dealt with by a statute; when, instead of looking upon a statute as something
to be judged after enactment, we look upon
it as something to be fashioned before it
becomes a law.
5. Applied to statutory terms and phrases,
"lis means that the object of inquiry is the
relation of latitude or definiteness of expression to the conditions under which the
statute is to operate, and to the organs to
which its language is addressed, and by
which it is to be construed in various stages
of application, administration, and enforcement. (Indefinite terms in defining subordinate and in defining adverse interests; indefite terms in penal statutes, in enabling
acts, in imposing civil liability, in adjusting
property rights, etc.)
6. Applied to the subject of statutory powers, it means that, after It has been ascertained, upon the basis of judicial decisions,
what are the tendencies in favor of or
against implying unexpressed powers, a systematic study will be made of the question
how far general enabling provisions will
serve beneficial purposes, and how far they
should be guarded by qualifications.
7. The question of statutory responsibil-

ity will be handled, not like that of criminal
responsibility at common law, as one of causation or guilt, but as the problem of accomplishing an object of public policy in the
most effectual manner and with the least
possible hardship, annoyance, and injustice.
8. In prescribing conditions for the validIty-of legal acts (a substantial proportion of
all statute law), the problem will be: How
much can be demanded, with the expectation
of reasonably convenient and certain compliance, and without jeopardizing the security of transactions by the risk of technical error? Everything additional means an
additional peril, if the requirements are treated as mandatory or jurisdictional; If treated as directory, they are liable to be ignored.
It is one of the tasks of a science of legislation to find a solution for this dilemma.
9. In choosing methods of control, legislation is confronted with the task of achieving its object with the least amount of restraint and friction. The solution of this
task involves the technique of publicity and
licensing requirements, of statutory liability
and compensation, and the question of the
legitimate province of standardization of
private action.
10. The province of a course In Statutes will thus be the discovery and development of rules that can be iredicated on the
basis of the data of the legislative, administrative, and judicial history of statutes, concerning the production of the maximum of
benefit by the minimum of restraint or requirement imposed by legislation.
11. A systematic synopsis of topics and
problems with regard to which rules applicable to legislation can be formulated will
be found in the special report of the Special
Committee on Legislative Drafting of the
American Bar Association for 1919.
12. Assuming a great body of rules to exist, or to be capable of development, that
should guide and control legislation, it
should further be recognized that these rules
are of a legal nature. They can be clearly
differentiated from norms of legislation, that
belong to the domain of economic science
or sociology. The relation to rules of Political or Administrative Science Is closer; but
here, too, the line can be drawn with great
clearness.
13. A rule of legislation is a legal rule,
if it Is based upon information and processes
of reasoning which constitute the lawyer's
equipment and habit of thought. The habit
of legal thought Is directed to clear and
sharp issues, fit for judicial determination,
while political thinking looks to action on
the basis of adjustment ahd compromise, and
formulates its issues accordingly. The province of law in legislation is the function
5f the legal formula in anticipating and
avoiding controversy.
14. The law that enters Into the making
of legislation differs from the law that enters
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into the making of a Judicial decision, in
that the latter operates with logical processes, the former with empirical data. The
nice problems in judicial law are problems
of logical refinement; those of legislative
law are problems of adjustment, of the fitness of given methods to produce desired results. In this respect a course in Statutes
differs fundamentally from other law school
courses.
15. This fact of fundamental difference
presents an initial difficulty in teaching
Statutes. The law student is used to reasoning out propositions, not to -considering
the fitness of means to ends. There is the
constant temptation of giving him what he
expects, namely, case law on Statutes. Moreover, he wants something that will be helpful in practice, and he does not look forward to being a draftsman of statutes. It
is therefore wise to insist constantly on the
close connection between drafting and construction, and never to let him forget that
in trying to find the most adequate legal formula he becomes familiar with the meaning
of formulas, adequate or inadequate, that
he finds in statutes.
16. The pedagogical value of a course in
Statutes is twofold. It teaches the student
to read a statute, so that he can recognize
the strength and weakness of its provisions,
and see, not only what is in the statute, but
also what is not in it, but ought to be. It
also teaches the student to think constructively, instead of thinking only critically. In
other courses there is likewise the possibility
of constructive thinking, but as a rule there
is no time to develop that phase of a subject.
17. From the point of view of jurisprudence or legal science, the value of the course
lies in opening the eyes of the student to
the part played by legislative thought in the
development of the law. In the law school,
statute law becomes taught law only in so
far as it has passed through the mind of a
court for judicial purposes. The student
never realizes that there is much in the way
of necessary legal development that judicial
thought, by reason of its inherent limitations,
is incapable of producing, and that must
come, and in large part has come, from the
constant thought that is given in the community to problems of legislation.

18. A course in Statutes cannot be conducted profitably on the basis of a collection
of cases. Even where cases are valuable,
what counts is generally not to be found in
the reasoning of the court. The unwisdom
of a given formula may be capable of being
demonstrated by a series of decisions, but
it would be waste of time to make the students read them. The decision of the Supreme Court, sustaining the constitutionality of a provision, may be less important
than a serious of acquittals, to be gathejed
only from newspaper reports, "in judging its
success or failure.
19. The proper material for teaching Statutes must be statutes. They are often dry
and discouraging reading, but occasionally
the dryness can be relieved by illuminating
glimpses into legislative or judicial .history.
In private law, marriage acts, adoption acts,
conveyancing acts, are typical statutes; in
public law, liquor laws, labor laws, railroad
laws, and public utility laws furnish abindant illustrations. Statutes which merely
codify common-law principles do not throw
light on the specific problems of legislation
that can be made the subject of instruction.
20. In a course .of about 44 hours, it is
possible to cover only a small part of the
topics outlined in the report above referred
to. . The most useful topics would probably
be Part I, B (definiteness of terms), E (enabling provisions), F (formal requirements), G
(remedial and savings provisions), and Part
II, B (publicity provisions), and 0 (licensing
provisions).
21. The subject as outlined deals with the
Technique of Legislation, with such phases
of statute law as are not peculiar to any
particular subject of legislation. There are
wider asli)ects of legislative jurisprudenceabove all, the problem of legislative standards and equities.
It would probably be
possible to make a study of legislation from
this more substantive point of view, and
contrast it with common law and with
equity. But that phase of legislation should
be divided among teachers of different subjects, if It is to receive competent treatment.
It might furnish material for fourth-year or
postgraduate courses, while a general coursn
in Statutes should form part of the regular
curriculum.
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